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This paper investigates whether shareholder value is affected by non-
compliance with the prescriptions of a principle-based ‘comply or explain’ sys-
tem of corporate governance in the context of the global financial crisis of
2007–2009. Using System Generalized Method of Moments estimates to control
for different types of endogeneity, the main findings of this paper suggest that
non-compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code adversely affects
shareholder value. Furthermore, ex-post estimates reveal that compliance with
certain corporate governance mechanisms is more beneficial than others. With
regard to this, compliance with provisions related to board independence is
more important than complying with performance-related pay requirements of
the code. These findings have implications for policy makers and financial
institutions regarding the usefulness of compliance with a prescribed code of
corporate governance, specifically during periods of financial distress.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Financial crises have existed throughout history, from
the Tulip Mania in the 1600s to the recent European debt
crisis. Exogenous shocks in the form of a financial crisis
can expose the underlying inefficacies of internal corpo-
rate governance mechanisms as drivers of shareholder
value. Following the global financial crisis of 2007–2009,
scholars were quick to link the inadequacies of corporate
governance mechanisms as one of the major causes of
the crisis (Conyon, Judge, & Useem, 2011; Gregoriou,
2009; Kirkpatrick, 2009).1 A broad spillover effect was
witnessed by most firms, and indeed the entire world
economy, as a result of the collapse of several large
financial institutions. Given the importance of financial
firms, this study examines the relationship between firm-
level corporate governance mechanisms and shareholder
value during the crisis. More specifically, this study con-
tributes to the understanding of the importance of con-
textual factors on the impact of non-compliance with a
prescribed code of corporate governance and shareholder
value before and during the financial crisis period.2
Financial institutions are fundamentally different from
their non-financial counterparts not only with regard to
their business model and stringent regulations but also in
terms of the scope of their corporate governance mecha-
nisms (Hopt, 2011). After the financial crisis of 2007-2009,
the issue of corporate governance mechanisms in financial
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institutions burst into the limelight and started gaining
attention from investors, academics, regulators and finan-
cial press. In fact, new regulatory measures and initiatives
originated following the crisis period to promote financial
stability and good corporate governance mechanisms and
to avert the possibilities of another financial crash in
future.3 Many countries reviewed and revised their corpo-
rate governance regulations following the 2007–2009
financial crisis. For instance, the Walker (2009) review of
corporate governance mechanisms in UK and the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(2010) in the US recommended substantial changes to the
composition of corporate boards of banks and large finan-
cial institutions.
Similarly, in the wake of the crisis in the UK, the
Financial Reporting Council (FRC)4 revised the corporate
governance code in 2010 and also issued the UK Steward-
ship Code for institutional investors. The purpose of all
these initiatives was to enhance fairness, transparency and
accountability in the corporate governance systems and to
provide protection to stakeholders of financial institu-
tions.5 Thus, understanding the real nature of factors that
can influence shareholder value and long-term success of
financial firms is an important research phenomenon
within the context of the financial crisis. This seems appro-
priate given that financial institutions were at the forefront
of the events leading to the financial crisis and prior stud-
ies largely exclude financial firms in their investigations
(Elamer, Ntim, Abdou, Zalata, & Elmagrhi, 2019).
Furthermore, firms in the financial sector are required
to report their compliance with the UK Corporate Gover-
nance Code (UK CGC) on the basis of ‘comply or explain’
in the same way as their non-financial counterparts. Com-
pliance with corporate governance codes is imperative for
financial firms to mitigate risk and to trigger a positive
market reaction. This is because higher market valuation
and better operating performance have been documented
in the existing literature for firms that comply with corpo-
rate governance codes (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003;
Hooghiemstra & van Ees, 2011; Ullah, Ahmad, Akbar,
Kodwani, & Frecknall-Hughes, 2020). Additionally, com-
pliance reduces information asymmetry through greater
disclosure and independent monitoring, ultimately leading
to a lower cost of capital (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Koirala,
Marshall, Neupane, & Thapa, 2020).
On the governance compliance and shareholder value
relationship, Gompers et al. (2003) argue that compliance
with a prescribed code of corporate governance positively
affects shareholder value for non-financial firms. Similarly,
strong corporate governance mechanisms are positively
associated with voluntary disclosures and the adoption of
International Financial Reporting Standards (Verriest,
Gaeremynck, & Thornton, 2013), as well as better
corporate social responsibility performance (Chen, Firth,
Gao, & Rui, 2006). However, questioning the effectiveness
of universal corporate governance standards, Van Essen,
Engelen, and Carney (2013) argue that the positive rela-
tionship and impact do not hold during the crisis period.
In the context of financial firms, Erkens, Hung, and
Matos (2012) examine the relationship between corporate
governance and firm performance during the financial cri-
sis, and report that firms with more independent boards
and higher institutional ownership exhibited lower share
returns. Similarly, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) report a nega-
tive relationship between board independence and stock
returns for a sample of 164 banks in 32 countries. They
measured the governance attributes of their sample banks
for the year 2006 only. It is, however, well documented in
the existing corporate governance literature, that using
cross-sectional data for analysing governance–
performance relationship suffers from endogeneity issues
and can produce erroneous results (Abdallah, Goergen, &
O'Sullivan, 2015; Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012).
In line with the above discussions, this study contrib-
utes to the existing literature by providing a unique focus
on the governance mechanisms and shareholder value in
the pre-crisis and crisis periods for UK financial firms.
Motivated by the studies of Erkens et al. (2012) and
Beltratti and Stulz (2012), this paper investigates whether
shareholder value is influenced by non-compliance with
the UK CGC for financial institutions, before and during
the financial crisis. Whilst the aforementioned studies
focussed on firm-specific governance mechanisms (corpo-
rate boards and ownership structures), the current study
develops a unique non-compliance index (NCI) as a
proxy for firm-level corporate governance. To address the
concerns that not all of the provisions in our equally
weighted governance index would affect shareholder
value equally, we also investigate the effectiveness of
compliance with individual provisions of the UK CGC.
Additionally, this research explores the effectiveness of
two key corporate governance mechanisms on share-
holder value, that is, monitoring mechanisms and direc-
tors' incentives. In doing so, the current study adds to the
stream of research that investigates various governance-
related factors and their impact on shareholder value, for
financial firms in a period of financial distress.
There is strong evidence in the existing literature that
good governance mechanisms help firms in the monitor-
ing of directors and aligning their interests with share-
holders. Agency theory suggests that improving
governance practices helps in reducing the wedge
between the interests of management and shareholders
which leads to enhanced firm value (Jensen & Meckling,
1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). However, the validity of
such claims has seldom been tested in extraordinary
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economic conditions in general and during a financial
crisis period in particular (Van Essen et al., 2013). It is,
however, evident that agency conflicts are more likely to
be exposed during a period of financial distress and crisis.
In light of these empirical and theoretical insights, this
study contributes to this debate and analyses how non-
compliance with a prescribed code of corporate gover-
nance is associated with shareholder value of financial
firms during a crisis period.
Using a sample of 86 UK financial firms, this study
finds that shareholder value is negatively associated with
the level of non-compliance with the UK CGC. The
results indicate that those financial firms which are non-
compliant with the prescribed code of corporate gover-
nance perform worse than their compliant counterparts.
Moreover, the negative impact of non-compliance is
more pronounced during the crisis period. The findings
further show that certain corporate governance mecha-
nisms are more likely to have positive impact on share-
holder value than others, such as, compliance with the
provisions related to the independence of non-executive
directors is more important than complying with
performance-based pay requirements.
Moreover, out of the two incentive mechanisms
employed in this study, directors' share ownership shows
a positive association with shareholder value, whereas
directors' remuneration is negatively associated with
shareholder value. This indicates that for aligning direc-
tors' interest with those of shareholders, directors' share
ownership is a more effective governance mechanism
than other form of remunerations. These findings signify
the need for using different governance mechanisms in
different economic conditions and contribute to the
growing body of literature that questions the universality
of corporate governance prescriptions in different juris-
dictions (Judge, 2012; Van Essen et al., 2013).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section outlines an overview of the existing literature in the
area and presents research hypotheses. Section 3 describes
research methodology and data sample. Section 4 discusses
the results and main findings of the study. Section 5 pre-
sents a discussion on the robustness analyses. Finally, Sec-
tion 6 concludes this paper by summarizing the
contributions, provides an overview of the implications and
highlights the limitations and scope for future research.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW AND
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
In circumstances where ownership is distributed and
managers own insignificant portion of companies, the
increased monitoring and accountability through
effective corporate governance systems are expected to
lead to an effective use of organizational resources and
improved profitability (Jensen, 1986). Existence of an
effective corporate governance system ensures that direc-
tors are not self-serving, and it makes them accountable
so that the free cash flows are returned to shareholders
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In line with this, Elamer
et al. (2019) suggest that ownership structures have a pos-
itive effect on the level of risk disclosure whilst Liu,
Padgett, and Varotto (2017) report that managerial own-
ership is an important solution to the agency conflict. It
can therefore be argued that effective corporate gover-
nance systems enhance the ability of firms to face periods
of financial distress such as a financial crisis.
2.1 | Financial institutions, agency
conflicts and governance mechanisms
Since the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976)
on the agency relationship, a vast academic literature has
been developed within this theoretical framework for
analysing the relationship between corporate governance
and different organizational outcomes. This literature
mainly focusses on the agency costs and conflicts as a
result of information asymmetry between managers and
shareholders.
The distinct characteristics of financial institutions,
such as their opaqueness, heavy regulation and the likeli-
hood of government bailouts, mean that a greater under-
standing of the factors which have been linked to their
effective governance mechanisms is pivotal. Due to the
higher likelihood of government bailouts, shareholders
may be less inclined to engage in monitoring activities
which may tempt the directors to engage in risky activi-
ties (Staikouras, Staikouras, & Agoraki, 2007). Intense
government regulation of financial sector may weaken
external governance mechanisms, such as hostile take-
overs and competition (Levine, 2004). Consequently,
internal governance mechanisms such as board structure
and disciplining managerial behaviour may take a central
role in mitigating the agency problems in financial insti-
tutions (Pathan, 2009). All these arguments demonstrate
that financial institutions are obliged to employ robust
governance mechanisms.
Furthermore, the scope of excessive risk taking by
managers in financial institutions has been a pervasive
feature of the financial crisis. Excessive risk taking, com-
bined with the ‘too-big-to-fail’ situation exacerbated the
moral hazard problems within financial institutions.
Consequently, directors' incentives such as compensa-
tions policies and share ownership may help to reduce
the likelihood of moral hazard problems due to the
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financial ramifications and align managers' interest with
shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer &
Vishny, 1997).
2.2 | Non-compliance and shareholder
value
The UK CGC maintains that good corporate governance
practices help improve monitoring, accountability and
transparency in organizations. A high level of compliance
with the code would ensure strong internal corporate
governance mechanisms within firms. To measure the
level of compliance (or non-compliance), indices have
been developed by commercial organizations as well as
researchers which have been used widely to study the
link between internal corporate governance and share-
holder value (see e.g., Baum, Chakraborty, & Liu, 2010;
Farag, Mallin, & Ow-Yong, 2014; Gompers et al., 2003;
Hawas & Tse, 2016). The main advantage of using a com-
posite measure is that it can provide a holistic view con-
cerning the efficacy of a firm's corporate governance
systems (Bikiris & Doukakis, 2011). Within the frame-
work of agency theory, one of the key assumptions in
using governance indices is that a higher level of compli-
ance with a prescribed code of corporate governance will
reflect better monitoring and control mechanisms to safe-
guard the interest of shareholders. A positive relationship
between the level of compliance and shareholder value is
therefore expected.
In the UK context, Dahya and McConnell (2007) find
a positive relationship between compliance and perfor-
mance (operating performance and share prices) for a
sample of non-financial companies. Similarly, Farag
et al. (2014) report a positive relationship between gover-
nance characteristics and financial performance of UK
firms listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM).
More recently, Hawas and Tse (2016) document that
compliance with the UK CGC is positively associated
with major shareholdings, which would indicate that
compliant firms are better monitored by such share-
holders. Moreover, Baum et al. (2010) report that compli-
ance positively affects the availability of credit during
uncertain economic time. Interestingly, Dedman (2016)
shows that non-compliance with one particular provision
of the governance code is not detrimental and may not
negatively affect firm performance. However, if compa-
nies are non-compliant with most of the provisions con-
sistently over a number of years, then it can be argued
that such a practice might be harmful for a company's
performance.
The sample periods of the aforementioned studies
cover a relatively stable economic environment which
makes it difficult to generalize these findings during
unstable financial periods. In addition, to the best of the
authors' knowledge, this is the first study to analyse
the association between the level of non-compliance with
the UK CGC and shareholder value for UK financial
firms during the financial crisis. We therefore argue that
as a result of the collapse of large financial firms during
the financial crisis, the governance compliance relation-
ship in this sector merits investigation and test the
following hypothesis:
H1. There is a negative relationship between the level of
non-compliance with the UK Corporate Governance
Code and shareholder value.
From the perspective of agency theory, monitoring
and incentives are fundamental tools for solving moral
hazard and adverse selection problems (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In line with
this, Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) document
that board size, independence and executive compensa-
tion are of particular importance in mitigating agency
problems in financial institutions. In addition, studies
have also documented that board structures affect the
degree of compliance with disclosure requirements
(Mangena & Tauringana, 2007) and risk of bankruptcy
(Darrat, Gray, Park, & Wu, 2016). Therefore, monitoring
and compensation will have implications for firm perfor-
mance during a financial crisis.
Most of the literature in this area supports the view
that enhanced monitoring and performance-linked
incentives have a positive impact on firms' performance
(see e.g., Bayless, 2009; Benito & Conyon, 1999; Benston,
1985; J. Chen, Zhang, Xiao, & Li, 2011; Coughlan &
Schmidt, 1985; Florackis, 2005; Murphy, 1985; Ozkan,
2011). However, many studies show a negative relation-
ship between compensation and firm performance and
regard it as a sign of weak internal corporate governance
and an agency cost (Adams, 2012; Bebchuk &
Fried, 2003; Denis, Hanouna, & Sarin, 2006; Florackis &
Ozkan, 2008). Moreover, in the context of the 2007–2008
financial crisis, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) document
that banks in which a higher proportion of CEO pay is
linked with company's performance performed worse
during the crisis. Additionally, based on interviews6 in
12 UK listed companies, Bender (2004) argued that per-
formance-related pay is used for strategic and human
resource purposes (i.e., retention and attraction) and to
conform to the current market practices, and it has no
positive effect on firm performance.
We contribute to this stream of literature by focussing
on two new and important proxies: that is, extra board
committees and internal controls, to measure the level of
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monitoring. Furthermore, for incentives, we focus on
remuneration as well as share ownership of executive
directors. Including both remuneration and share owner-
ship enables us to analyse the impact of different types of
incentives on shareholder value during difficult economic
times. By doing so, we contribute to this stream of litera-
ture and investigate whether or not different types of
incentives affect shareholder value differently during a
financial crisis.
In light of the above discussions, we argue that corpo-
rate governance mechanisms that enhance effective mon-
itoring to align directors' interests with the shareholders
may have positive impact on shareholder value, espe-
cially in times of financial distress (such as a global finan-
cial crisis), as during these periods agency conflicts are
more likely to be exposed. Against this backdrop, we
investigate the efficacy of internal corporate governance
mechanisms based on a number of individual mecha-
nisms related to: (i) monitoring (board independence,
board committees and internal controls) and
(ii) directors' incentives (compensation and share owner-
ship) and form the following hypotheses:
H2a. There is a positive relationship between monitoring
mechanisms and shareholder value.
H2b. There is a positive relationship between directors'
incentives and shareholder value.
3 | DATA AND MODEL
3.1 | Data
The panel dataset of this study consists of 86 financial
firms7 listed on FTSE 350 for the period 2003–2010. In
order to be part of the sample, two key criteria had to be
met: (i) firms were required to have been listed for at
least 3 years prior to 2007 and (ii) the same set of compa-
nies (in (i)) were required to be listed post-2007 in order
to make meaningful comparison between the two
periods. Data were collected from four different sources,
namely: Morningstar Company Intelligence,8* companies'
annual reports, Datastream and Companies House. The
data for non-compliance with the UK corporate gover-
nance code were hand-collected from the annual reports
of the sample firms. Data for other corporate governance
variables such as board independence, remuneration,
directors' share ownership and board size were collected
from Morningstar Company Intelligence whilst the finan-
cial data were extracted from Datastream. In those cir-
cumstances when companies were delisted at some point
in the period after 2007, and where data were not
available from Morningstar Company Intelligence or their
websites, the required data were collected from Compa-
nies House.
3.2 | Model specification
Issues of endogeneity have been reported by prior
literature within the corporate governance—performance
research. Covering these issues, Wintoki et al. (2012)
report at least three sources of endogeneity in governance–
performance research, which include unobservable het-
erogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity. It is
also documented that the presence of at least one form of
endogeneity leads to inconsistent and inefficient esti-
mates leading to unreliable inferences (Abdallah
et al., 2015). A number of methods have been proposed
in the literature that minimizes or controls the problems
of endogeneity, such as, inclusion of instrumental vari-
ables, use of fixed effects models and application of gen-
eralized methods of moments (GMM) estimates, inter
alia. However, as highlighted by Wooldridge (2002),
before selecting an instrumental variable, two conditions
are required to be met. First, the instrumental variable
must be uncorrelated with the error term of the econo-
metric model. Second, it should be partially correlated
with one of the endogenous variables. It is however par-
ticularly difficult to find an instrumental variable which
could satisfy both these conditions, which makes this
approach unsuitable to implement.
The use of fixed effects models can potentially elimi-
nate the bias arising from unobservable heterogeneity.
However, Schultz, Tan, and Walsh (2010) argue that fixed
effects panel specifications only produce consistent
parameter estimates under the assumption of strict
exogeneity. It has been widely documented that the
governance–performance relationship is subject to simul-
taneity and dynamic endogeneity and the assumption of
strict exogeneity therefore does not hold. Wintoki
et al. (2012) recommend the use of GMM and argue that
the presence of simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity
violates the strict exogeneity assumption of the fixed
effects panel estimations, as it results in the regressors
being contemporaneously correlated with the error term.
In order to test, for the presence of endogeneity, we
applied the standard Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test.
The results are reported in Table 1, which shows that
apart from Capital and Beta all other variables are endog-
enous. We therefore argue that the application of OLS or
fixed effects models will produce inconsistent estimates.
To account for the endogenous effect of the lagged depen-
dent variable, the system GMM estimator makes use of
the lagged differences of the dependent variable as
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instruments for the equation in levels as well as lagged
levels of the dependent variable as instruments for the
equation in first differences (Arellano & Bover, 1995).
Therefore, we use a dynamic GMM estimator, proposed
by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and
Bond (1998).
3.3 | Model
In order to control for the effects of potential simultaneity
and reverse causality problems, Ammann, Oesch, and
Schmid (2011) recommend the use of lagged variables as
instruments for the present values of those variables. In
line with this, the econometric model of this study is
applied in three different steps. First, the regression equa-
tion is rewritten as a dynamic model that includes lagged
shareholder value as an explanatory variable. Second, we
take first differences of all variables which control for
unobservable heterogeneity and eliminate a potential
omitted variables bias. Third, we estimate the model with
application of system GMM and use lagged values of the
governance variables and shareholder value, as
instruments.9
The following model was estimated:
Yit = αYi, t−1 + β1NCIit + β2Monitoringit
+ β3Incentivesit + β4Controlit + ui +ωit,
ð1Þ
where Yit is the dependent variable denoting shareholder
value where i = 1…86 financial firms across
t (2003–2010). Monitoring represents the corporate gover-
nance variables related to monitoring (board
independence, extra board committees and internal con-
trol mechanisms), whereas Incentives represent corporate
governance mechanisms in relation to directors' incen-
tives (directors' share ownership and remuneration). Con-
trol represents a number of control variables employed in
this study. Finally, εit = ui + ωit is the standard fixed/ran-
dom effects decomposition of the error term.
The dependent variable (Yit) is measured by two prox-
ies, total shareholder returns (TSR) and return on equity
(ROE). Total shareholder returns is calculated as the sum
of capital gains and dividend yields (Zakaria, 2012),
whereas, return on equity is calculated as net income
(net profit after tax) divided by the book value of equity.
The main explanatory variable of this study is the
NCI. We carried out content analysis of 688 corporate
governance reports (86 firms, 8 years) to develop this
non-compliance index for each firm in our sample. This
index is used as a proxy for the level of non-compliance
with the UK CGC. The index is constructed by assigning
one point for each occurrence of non-compliance with
the UK CGC.10 For example, the UK CGC recommends
that the role of chairman and CEO should not be per-
formed by one individual. Therefore, if a company com-
plies with this provision, in our NCI, it takes the value of
0 and 1 otherwise. This allowed us to investigate the
impact of non-compliance and shareholder value more
explicitly. The methodology of index construction is con-
sistent with several existing studies (Farag et al., 2014;
Gompers et al., 2003; Hawas & Tse, 2016). A total of
22 provisions are included in the index, so the non-
compliance score for each firm vary between 0 (fully
compliant) and 22 (fully non-compliant). All these provi-
sions are outlined in Appendix.
Firm size measured as the natural log of total sales is
used a control variable (Ahmed & Hla, 2019; Weir,
Laing, & McKnight, 2002). In addition to this, availability
of liquid resources could also have implications for share-
holder value. We therefore control for firms' liquidity
(Alexiou, Mohamed, & Nellis, 2019; Dong, Girardone, &
Kuo, 2017). Prior studies also report that the amount of
capital available to a firm could affect shareholder value,
especially in crisis situations (Beekes & Brown, 2006).
The capital ratio is therefore introduced as a control vari-
able in our model (Beltratti & Stulz, 2012). Similarly, rela-
tive riskiness of a firm is important for shareholder value.
Consequently, we control for risk by using market beta
as a control variable in the study (Gonzalez &
André, 2014). It is also well documented that in terms of
board effectiveness and decision-making ability, small
corporate boards perform better than large boards
(Federo & Saz-Carranza, 2018; Yermack, 1996). In addi-
tion, smaller boards are also regarded as more valuable
in financially distressed firms (Dowell, Shackell, &
TABLE 1 DWH test for endogeneity
Independent and control variables F-test p-value
NCI 4.34 .037
Board independence 77.85 .000
Extra committees 8.44 .003
Internal controls 17.61 .000
Directors' share ownership 4.17 .014
Remuneration 9.36 .002
Leverage 10.70 .001
Firm size 8.08 .005
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Stuart, 2011). We therefore use board size as a control
variable in our analyses. Finally, the level of debt financ-
ing could have implications for shareholder value during
stable and unstable business periods. To that end, we also
introduce leverage as a control variable (Sarhan, Ntim, &
Al-Najjar, 2019; Zalata & Roberts, 2016). Definitions of
all the variables in our model are presented in Table 2.
Finally, in order to analyse the hypothesized relation-
ship between the level of NCI and shareholder value, we
estimate Equation (1) using both proxies of the depen-
dant variable (total shareholder returns and return on
equity). We further estimate Equation (1) for two time
periods, pre-crisis (2003–2006) and during crisis
(2007–2010). The results are discussed in the next
section.
4 | RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 | Preliminary analyses
Table 3 outlines the descriptive statistics for all variables
used in this study. Winsorization has been applied to the
top and bottom 1% of observations to control for extreme
values. The data in Table 3 indicate that on average, the
non-compliance index score over the period of our ana-
lyses was 3.57 and had a maximum value of 16. Variance
inflation factors (VIF) and tolerance statistics were used
to test for the potential effects of multicollinearity among
the variables.11 The values of all VIFs remained well
below the commonly used threshold of 10. Our results
showed that the maximum value for VIF was 1.56,
whereas the lowest value for tolerance statistics was
0.62. On this basis, we can confirm that multicollinearity
does not appear to be a problem in our data (Field, 2009).
Similarly, the tolerance statistics for all variables was
above the threshold of 0.10, which is again an indication
of the non-existence of multicollinearity amongst our
variables.
We also carried out two postspecification tests follow-
ing the GMM estimation (Arellano & Bond, 1991).
Hansen–Sargan J-test was employed to test for over-
identifying restrictions and for checking the validity of
the moment conditions in our study (Hansen, 1982;
Sargan, 1958). The second test we carried out was the
residual autocorrelation (AR). This test allowed us to
confirm that the second-order autocorrelation is zero.
Results of the two specification tests confirm that the null
hypothesis of valid restrictions cannot be rejected for all
four models. More specifically, the results of Hansen test
suggest that the instruments used in our models are
valid, and the results of the residual autocorrelation test
show no signs of serial autocorrelation of the second
order (AR2) in any of our models.
4.2 | NCI and shareholder value
The distribution of coefficients of our GMM regression
model across 86 UK financial firms is presented in
Table 4. This table is divided into four models. The first
model reports the results with TSR as the dependant vari-
able for the pre-crisis period, while the second model
documents the results with ROE as the dependant vari-
able for the pre-crisis period. The final two models















A score ranging between 0 and 22.
Showing the level of non-compliance




The ratio of NEDs to total board size.
Extra committees The number of extra committees in
addition to audit, remuneration and
nomination committee.




The total percentage of equity shares
held by all board members.
Remuneration in £
million
The total remuneration paid to
directors.
Control variables
Board size The total number of directors on board.
Liquidity The ratio of a firm's current assets to
current liabilities.
Capital ratio (%) The percentage of total equity to total
risk-weighted assets.
Beta value A measure of company riskiness.
Firm size Natural log of total sales.
Leverage The percentage of total debt to total
assets.
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present the results for the two dependent variables dur-
ing the crisis period.
As reported in Table 4, the main explanatory variable
of the study, NCI, is negatively associated with both mea-
sures of shareholder value. It is also evident from the
results in Table 4 that the negative association between
NCI and shareholder value is stronger during the finan-
cial crisis period, and the results are significant. We
therefore accept H1 which predicts a negative relation-
ship between the level of non-compliance with the UK
CGC and the shareholder value for financial firms. This
result supports the view that non-compliance with a pre-
scribed code of good corporate governance could have
negative implications for shareholder value. This finding
is consistent with the existing literature in this area
(Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2009; Farag et al., 2014;
Gompers et al., 2003). Non-compliance with the pre-
scribed code of good governance may indicate that such
firms have weak monitoring and control mechanisms,
which may lead to a decrease in shareholders' wealth as
advocated by agency theory. Hooghiemstra and van
Ees (2011) report that when firms are given a choice of
‘comply or explain’ they tend to comply. These results
provide further justification as to why this is the case, as
non-compliance may be perceived as weak governance
by shareholders.
Since the time period of the current study includes
an economic time period where financial firms around
the world faced extreme financing difficulties and
reported poor performance, it is therefore possible that
the decline in shareholder value may have been a result
of the external shock rather than non-compliance.
Persisting with the argument that good corporate gover-
nance makes firms more resilient to shocks in external
markets, we divided our sample into compliant and
non-compliant firms on the basis of NCI score to com-
pare their results during the crisis period (2007–2010).
We constructed two groups, ‘compliant firms’ with an
NCI score of less than 7,12 and ‘non-compliant firms’
with an NCI of 7 or more. Results in Panel A of Table 5
highlight that the percentage losses (fall in ROE) suf-
fered by ‘non-compliant firms’ is significantly more
than the losses experienced by ‘compliant firms’ during
the crisis period. This supports our conjecture that com-
pliant firms are more resilient to negative effects of
adverse economic conditions, such as, the financial
crisis.
Our results extend the findings of previously publi-
shed UK studies in this area. For example, Dahya and
McConnell (2007) and Shrives and Brennan (2015) report
that over the years, compliance with the UK CGC has
increased. Similarly, Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud
(2010) who studied a sample of 245 non-financial FTSE
350 firms over the period 1998–2004 show that the level
of compliance with the UK Corporate Governance
Code13 has increased. More recently, Hawas and
Tse (2016) document that compliance with the UK CGC
is positively associated with major shareholdings, which
would indicate that compliant firms are better monitored
by such shareholders. Our findings show that non-
TABLE 3 Descriptive statistics for
all variables
Variables Observations Mean Std. dev. Min Max
TSR (%) 679 10.24 25.65 −34.65 56.57
ROE (%) 679 2.99 4.67 −3.19 19.65
NCI 679 3.57 2.96 0.00 16.00
Board independence 679 0.72 0.21 0.14 1.00
Directors' share ownership (%) 679 2.29 4.46 0.02 21.23
Remuneration (£million) 679 2.41 2.10 0.11 7.12
Extra committees 679 1.24 1.16 0.00 5.00
Internal controls 679 9.88 2.57 0.00 14.00
Board size 679 8.18 2.95 3.00 20.00
Beta 679 1.06 0.45 0.30 2.30
Liquidity 679 1.79 1.48 0.31 4.83
Leverage (%) 679 20.65 18.63 0.00 63.06
Firm size 679 2.48 6.02 0.02 21.27
Capital (%) 679 56.10 36.20 2.77 104.83
Note: Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample. Std. dev., min and max donate the standard
deviation, the minimum and the maximum, respectively. The total observations should have been 688 (86
firms * 8 years). However, 2 years' data were missing for two companies, 1-year data were missing for two
companies and 3 years' data were missing for another company. This has resulted in reducing the total
observations to 679 (688–9).
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TABLE 4 Regression results for corporate governance and the shareholder value
Pre–crisis (2003–2006) During–crisis (2007–2010)
VARIABLES TSR ROE TSR ROE
L.1 0.474*** 0.880*** 0.273*** 0.165***
(0.044) (0.108) (0.005) (0.011)
L.2 — — 0.408*** 0.777***
— — (0.007) (0.006)
NCI −0.347 −0.457*** −1.645** −0.246***
(0.435) (0.134) (0.696) (0.090)
Monitoring variables
Board Independence −12.49*** −1.146* −52.83*** −7.615***
(3.170) (0.647) (3.292) (0.517)
Extra committees −1.984 −0.404 −2.253 −1.565***
(1.804) (0.309) (1.598) (0.178)
Internal controls 3.006*** 0.592*** 4.567*** 2.256***
(0.642) (0.188) (0.701) (0.105)
Incentives variables
Directors' share ownership 0.416*** 0.0604 0.380*** 0.0650*
(0.140) (0.098) (0.056) (0.033)
Remuneration −0.285 −0.115** −0.496*** −0.0691***
(0.266) (0.055) (0.152) (0.019)
Control variables
Leverage 0.134* 0.0367*** −0.960*** −0.0312***
(0.079) (0.011) (0.049) (0.006)
Firm size −0.114 −0.0311* −0.126 −0.0439***
(0.152) (0.017) (0.088) (0.014)
Board size −1.186** −0.181 1.432*** 0.464***
(0.485) (0.119) (0.321) (0.041)
Capital 0.212*** 0.0465*** 0.737*** 0.100***
(0.044) (0.010) (0.028) (0.007)
Beta −4.933 −0.791 −8.879*** −2.994***
(6.064) (0.839) (0.870) (0.195)
Liquidity 0.0515 −0.142*** 0.196 −0.0353
(0.245) (0.047) (0.223) (0.041)
Constant 7.383 7.050** 41.31*** 14.72***
(12.260) (2.849) (8.179) (1.159)
J-test (p-value) 33.72(.142) 75.45(1.00) 79.75(1.00) 39.750(.22)
AR (1) (p-value) −3.21(.001) −3.04(.002) −4.86(.000) −2.84(.004)
AR (2) (p-value) −0.43(.918) 0.18(.85) −1.53(.125) −0.62(.53)
Observations 258 258 335 335
Number of firms 86 86 86 86
Note: Table 4 provides the results when the data are analysed for the pre-crisis period (i.e., 2003–2006) and crisis period (i.e., 2007–2010). TSR and ROE are
dependent variables. L.1 and L.2 are lags 1 and 2, respectively, of the dependent variables. The independent variables are NCI (level of non-compliance with
the UK CGC), board independence (the ratio of non-executive directors on board), extra committees (the number of extra board committees in addition to
nomination, audit and remuneration committees), internal controls (the number of internal control systems in place within the company), directors' share
ownership (total percentage of shares held by the board of directors), remuneration (total remuneration of board members), leverage (the ratio of total debt to
assets), firm size (log of total sales), board size (total number of board members), capital (the ratio of total equity to total assets), beta (a measure of systematic
risk), and liquidity (the ratio of current assets to current liabilities).*** significance at p < .01, ** significance at p < .05, * significance at p < .1. Standard errors
in parentheses.
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compliance with UK CGC is negatively associated with
shareholder value and recommend compliance with the
prevailing governance regulations.
4.3 | Monitoring mechanisms and
shareholder value
In relation to monitoring mechanisms, Table 4 shows
that board independence is significantly negatively asso-
ciated with both measures of shareholder value. This
finding does not support the hypothesized positive rela-
tionship between increased monitoring (represented by
board independence) and shareholder value. Indepen-
dence is captured by the number of NEDs as reported by
firms in their annual reports and does not take into
account whether such directors meet the independence
criteria set out by the UK CGC. Therefore, a director can
be non-executive director, but it does not necessarily
mean that he/she is independent as well.
This finding is in line with a number of recent studies
that report a negative relationship between board
independence and performance of financial firms
(Adams, 2012; Beltratti & Stulz, 2012). Similarly, in a
recent cross country study, Vallascas, Mollah, and
Keasey (2017) argue that board independence reduces
risk for only those banks which received government
bailouts. This implies that board independence may not
be as beneficial for financial firms as preciously per-
ceived, and its usefulness may be contingent upon other
factors such as meeting the independence criteria set out
by the UK CGC. Furthermore, the coefficients of board
independence and both measures of shareholder value
increased substantially during the crisis period. The coef-
ficients (TSR −52.83 and ROE −7.615) during the crisis
period are significantly larger than those in the pre-crisis
period (TSR −12.49, ROE −1.146). This indicates that the
negative impact of higher numbers of NEDs representa-
tion on boards increases during the crisis period.
We further divided our sample into two groups on the
basis of NED ratio of 0.5014 to examine whether the nega-
tive impact is associated with the financial crisis. A firm
with a ratio of 0.50 or more is classified as ‘higher NED
ratio,’ whereas a firm with a ratio of less than 0.50 is clas-
sified as ‘lower NED ratio.’ As reported in Panel B of
Table 4, the percentage decrease in the shareholder value
of firms with ‘higher NED ratio’ is significantly higher
than those firms which maintained a ‘lower NED ratio’
during the crisis period. This suggests that the negative
impact of the presence of NEDs on shareholder value is
stronger in those financial firms which maintained a
higher number of NEDs on their boards during crisis
period.
A number of explanations have been advanced in the
literature to explain this negative relationship between
board independence and shareholder value. One line of
explanation highlights the dependence of independent
directors on top management of firms, whereas another
argument discusses the level of firm-specific knowledge
of the independent directors. For example, Choi and
Hasan (2005) explain the negative relationship between
board independence and shareholder value through man-
agerial hegemony theory, according to which, the nega-
tive relationship describes independent directors'
dependency on top management. In the same vein,
Adams (2012) documents that due to lack of adequate
knowledge about a firm's business operations, indepen-
dent directors might not be able to provide strategic
advice or monitor executive management when it is
needed the most, which may be driving the negative rela-
tionship between board independence and shareholder
value. It is therefore argued that only increasing the
number of NEDs without taking into account all other
relevant measures may not be sufficient for increasing
shareholder value.
In addition, while explaining the negative relation-
ship between board independence and shareholder value,
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) argue that during the crisis
period, banks chose shareholder friendly boards
(i.e., boards with higher number of NEDs) as they were
exposed to more risks due to their strategies. It was the
risky strategies of the banks, rather than their governance
mechanisms, which have led to poor shareholder value
during the crisis period. However, it can also be argued
TABLE 5 NCI score and NED ratio
comparison during the crisis period
Variables Compliant firms Non-compliant firms
t p-valuePanel A NCI < 7 NCI > =7
TSR 43.1631 11.6600 0.3069 0.759
ROE 83.9753 −148.1080 39.6115 0.076
Panel B
Lower NED ratio Higher NED ratio
t p-valueNED ratio < 0.50 NED ratio > =0.50
TSR −79.8983 −271.4492 −1.4002 .1624
ROE 81.3297 −67.7933 −1.4976 .0135
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that if these banks performed poorly due to excessive
risk-taking practices, then this could indicate that NEDs
have failed in their duty to monitor and challenge exces-
sive risk-taking. In such circumstances, increasing the
number of NEDs on boards could negatively affect the
shareholder value of firm.
Another explanation for the negative relationship
between board independence and shareholder value
relates to personal cost to directors. As explained by
Lipton and Lorsch (1992), personal costs to directors fall
in large boards, which gives rise to the ‘free riding’ prob-
lem. This argument could be extended to NEDs, as in the
case of poor shareholder value, it is the executive directors
who are held responsible for poor shareholder value.
Therefore, due to the minimal personal costs, NEDs may
lack motivation to monitor executive directors adequately.
The results in Table 4 also highlight another key mon-
itoring tool, the number of internal control systems within
an organization, as being positively associated with share-
holder value. This finding supports H2a which predicts a
positive relationship between effective monitoring (in this
case represented by the number of internal control sys-
tems) and the shareholder value. This finding is consistent
with (Gupta, Sami, & Zhou, 2018), who argue that strong
internal controls are associated with decreased price vola-
tility and increased trading volume. This finding extends
existing literature on the effectiveness of internal control
systems as a monitoring tool for protecting the interests of
shareholders. Additionally, consistent with the notions of
the agency theory, internal control systems could mitigate
the conflict of interest between agents and principals, thus
leading to improved shareholder value. More specifically,
our results suggest that all those financial firms that had
introduced more internal control systems in our sample
performed better than firms which had implemented
fewer internal control systems.
Finally, Table 4 further reports that as far as extra
committees on board are concerned, our results are statis-
tically insignificant during the pre-crisis period. The neg-
ative relationship between extra board committees and
ROE during the crisis period indicates that our results are
consistent with the findings of McKnight and Weir (2009).
This could mean that during the crisis period, increasing
the number of board committees might be detrimental to
shareholder value and is consistent with the view that
board committees lead to more agency costs.
4.4 | Incentive mechanisms and
shareholder value
Two incentive mechanisms have been investigated in this
study, namely: the directors' share ownership and
directors' remuneration. These two mechanisms serve to
align directors' interests with the shareholders. The
results in Table 4 show that of the two incentive mecha-
nisms, directors' share ownership is more effective in
increasing shareholder value. Our results indicate that
directors' share ownership is positively associated with
shareholder value during the pre-crisis and crisis periods,
for both measures of shareholder value. This supports
H2b which predicts a positive relationship between direc-
tors' incentives (in this case, represented by directors'
share ownership) and the shareholder value. This finding
extends the existing literature in this area which report
that equity-based incentives are beneficial for reducing
various types of agency costs such as, audit fees (Gotti,
Han, Higgs, & Kang, 2012) and management pay
(Janakiraman, Radhakrishnan, & Tsang, 2010).
However, a negative relationship is reported between
directors' remuneration and shareholder value con-
tradicting H2b, which predicts a positive relationship
between directors' incentives (in this case, represented by
remuneration) and shareholder value. This finding indi-
cates that remuneration is not an effective tool for
aligning directors' interests with those of the share-
holders. Studies such as Morck, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1988) reported a negative relationship between
remuneration and shareholder value and argue that
higher remuneration could be the result of weak internal
corporate governance mechanisms within a firm. Simi-
larly, explaining the negative relationship between execu-
tive compensation and firm performance in the context
of financial crisis, Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman (2015)
argue that firms with high executive remuneration expe-
rienced poor performance during the financial crisis. This
implies that higher remuneration paid to directors could
result in higher agency costs.
In the UK context, remuneration structures in finan-
cial institutions may have encouraged short-termism and
excessive risk-taking attitude. Existing literature provides
evidence of a positive association between directors
remuneration/compensation and banks' risk (Cheng
et al., 2015). Based on the results provided in Table 4, it is
therefore argued that for our sample of financial firms,
higher remunerations paid to directors may have encour-
aged excessive risk-taking; however' this did not translate
into improved shareholder value. It is also evident from
our results that the negative relationship between remu-
neration and shareholder value is stronger and signifi-
cant in the crisis period as compared to the pre-crisis
period. This suggests that those UK financial institutions
that paid higher remunerations to their directors for
aligning their interests with shareholders performed
poorly during the financial crisis. This finding is consis-
tent with the view presented in prior literature that
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suggested that financial firms' excessive risk-taking
behaviour led to poor shareholder value during the crisis
period (Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011; Van Essen
et al., 2013). We also investigated remuneration paid
based on the board size and re-analysed the data; how-
ever, the results were largely unchanged.15
Therefore, our results suggest that share ownership is
a more effective incentive mechanism in increasing
shareholder value and for aligning directors' interests
with those of the shareholders as compared to directors'
remuneration. Directors' incentives in the form of
increased ownership are expected to encourage directors
to take a long-term view which helps in enhancing the
shareholder value.
4.5 | Compliance with individual
provisions of the UK CGC
We further analyse the relationship between non-
compliance and shareholder value by running our regres-
sions on individual provisions of our index to address the
concerns discussed in prior literature suggesting that not
all of the provisions in an equally weighted governance
index would affect shareholder value of firms equally
(Bebchuk et al., 2009). The individual provisions consid-
ered were P2, P3, P4, P8, P11, P15 and P18 on the basis
that most of our sample firms were non-compliant with
these provisions more frequently. However, only P15 and
P18 were identified as consistently negatively associated
with ROE and TSR.16 According to the results of Princi-
pal Component Analysis (PCA),17 six components were
identified as having eigenvalues of over 1 and collectively
explaining 60.6% of the variance. Out of these six compo-
nents only two (incentives and monitoring) were signifi-
cantly associated with shareholder value. Incentives
consist of factors related to the remuneration structure,
whereas monitoring is related to the existence of
independent non-executive directors on corporate boards
and various sub-committees. In the case of incentives,
non-compliance with the given provisions was positively
associated with shareholder value; however, monitoring
non-compliance was negatively associated with share-
holder value.
Although the UK CGC requires companies to pay
performance-based salaries to their directors, our results
indicate that those companies which are non-compliant
with such provisions had better shareholder value in the
period leading up to financial crisis, as well as during the
crisis. In other words, those firms which paid performance-
related pay to their directors performed worse than their
counterparts where directors' pay was not based on perfor-
mance. These results are consistent with Carter, Lei,
Marcus, and Tehranian (2016), who argue that abnormally
high compensation predicts worse future shareholder value
and high pay represents an agency problem.
In relation to firms' non-compliance with those provi-
sions of the UK CGC that are related to monitoring, our
findings imply that it is beneficial for companies to com-
ply with these requirements of the UK CGC. It is how-
ever important to note that in relation to monitoring, the
emphasis is placed on the strictly defined independence
of non-executive directors as highlighted in Section 4.2.
The UK CGC outlines a number of requirements (for
instance, NED's time on board, family ties and material
business transactions with the firm, amongst other
things) that need to be met before a director can be con-
sidered as independent. Our results show that those firms
which are meeting the compliance requirement of inde-
pendent non-executive directors perform better than
those which are non-compliant. Comparing this result to
the findings discussed in Section 4.2, it can be argued that
NEDs could only enhance monitoring if such directors
meet the strict independence criteria set out by the
UK CGC.
5 | ROBUSTNESS TESTS
In order to test the robustness of our results, we analyse
the data for the whole sample period (2003–2010). The
results are presented in Table 6. We also used return on
asset (ROA) as an alternative measure of shareholder
value and redid our analyses for the whole sample period,
pre-crisis period and the crisis period (see Table 7). The
results in Tables 6 and 7 indicate that the main explana-
tory variable, NCI, is still negatively associated with
shareholder value during the pre-crisis period, crisis
period, as well as the whole sample period. In light of
these results, it may thus be concluded that the findings
of this study are robust to different measures of share-
holder value. Similarly, in the revised analyses (when
data are analysed for the whole sample period with ROA
as the measure of shareholder value), board indepen-
dence is still negatively associated with shareholder
value. The positive impact of directors' share ownership
and internal control systems is also robust to the use of
different measures of shareholder value as well as when
the data are analysed for the whole of the sample period.
6 | CONCLUSION
Using a sample of UK financial firms, this study exam-
ined the effect of non-compliance with the UK CGC on
shareholder value. The paper also investigated the
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efficacy of two key firm-level corporate governance
mechanisms (monitoring and incentives) for reducing
agency problems and improving shareholder value dur-
ing a period of financial distress. The results show that
non-compliance with the UK CGC is negatively associated
with shareholder value, and this negative impact is more
pronounced during the crisis period suggesting that non-
compliance can make firms more vulnerable during
periods of financial distress. This implies that although UK
firms have a choice to comply with the UK CGC or provide
explanation for their non-compliance, it is in the interest of
companies to comply as non-compliance could lead to a
decrease in shareholders' wealth. Furthermore, non-
compliance may reduce the resilience of firms and could
make them vulnerable to the negative effects of adverse
economic conditions, such as, a financial crisis. This find-
ing is in line with the predictions of agency theory and sup-
ports those views which regard corporate governance code
as an appropriate mechanism for reducing the agency
problems and protecting the interests of shareholders.
In relation to monitoring mechanisms, having a
higher number of internal control mechanisms within
financial firms appear to be an effective monitoring
mechanism, as opposed to board independence and extra
board committees. Our findings report a strong positive
association between the number of internal control
mechanisms and shareholder value in general and during
the crisis period, in particular. On the contrary, however,
board independence (as represented by the number of
NEDs) is reported as being significantly negatively associ-
ated with both measures of shareholder value. The results
of this study also show that during the crisis period,
shareholder value for financial firms with more indepen-
dent boards was significantly lower than their counter-
parts with less independent boards. This suggests that
during difficult economic conditions, the impact of finan-
cial crisis was more severe in firms with more indepen-
dent boards. This ex post observed failure of board
independence as an effective monitoring tool to curtail
losses during the crisis is in line with prior literature.
Although, non-compliance with the requirements of
independent non-executive directors is negatively associ-
ated with shareholder value, it is important to note that
compliance with the UK CGC's provisions in relation to
independence means abiding by the code's strict require-
ments in terms of independence. However, having a
higher number of NEDs is negatively associated with
shareholder value. As discussed earlier, this is just the
number of NEDs on board, and they may not be classi-
fied as independent directors as per the requirements of
the UK CGC. This implies that independence of NEDs is
more important than the number of NEDs and pinpoints
the importance of directors' real independence for UK
TABLE 6 Regression results for corporate governance and the















Board Independence −55.22*** −6.166***
(3.426) (0.372)
Extra committees −0.211 −1.333***
(2.073) (0.203)












Firm size −0.0172 −0.0554***
(0.149) (0.005)










J-test (p-value) 79.86(1.00) 44.96(1.00)
AR (1) (p-value) −4.89(.000) −2.99(.002)
AR (2) (p-value) −1.62(.1038) −0.38(.69)
Observations 421 507
Number of firms 86 86
Note: Table 6 provides the results when the data are analysed for the whole
sample period (i.e., 2003–2010). All variables are exactly the same as those
used in Table 4. L.1, L.2 and L.3 are lags 1, 2 and 3, respectively, of the
dependent variables. *** significance at p < .01, ** significance at p < .05, *
significance at p < .1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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TABLE 7 Regression results for corporate governance and the shareholder value using ROA as a measure of shareholder value
Whole period (2003–2010) Pre-crisis (2003–2007) During crisis (2007–2010)
VARIABLES ROA ROA ROA
L.1 0.651*** 0.529*** 0.632***
(0.016) (0.049) (0.014)
L.2 0.997*** - 1.059***
(0.023) - (0.024)
L.3 0.0126 - -
(0.020) - -
NCI −0.954*** −0.413*** −0.826***
(0.077) (0.124) (0.056)
Monitoring variables
Board Independence −8.312*** −0.237 −7.947***
(0.607) (0.429) (0.489)
Extra committees −0.395 −0.423 −0.505
(0.287) (0.311) (0.313)
Internal controls 1.182*** 0.300** 1.343***
(0.102) (0.125) (0.116)
Incentives variables
Directors' share ownership 0.0199 0.142** 0.0122
(0.015) (0.056) (0.011)
Remuneration −0.168*** −0.164** −0.166***
(0.022) (0.065) (0.013)
Control variables
Leverage −0.0859*** −0.0132 −0.0797***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.006)
Firm size −0.0519*** −0.0287* −0.0573***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.015)
Board size −0.612*** −0.109 0.532***
(0.039) (0.073) (0.027)
Capital 0.0443*** 0.0284*** 0.0337***
(0.003) (0.009) (0.003)
Beta −3.918*** −2.554*** −3.799***
(0.179) (0.651) (0.153)
Liquidity −0.0185 0.0552* 0.0284
(0.022) (0.031) (0.019)
Constant 11.30*** 0.239 8.798***
(0.963) (1.934) (1.144)
J-test (p-value) 76.57(1.00) 37.92(.29) 73.34(1.00)
AR (1) (p-value) −2.86(.004) −1.45(.146) −2.84(.004)
AR (2) (p-value) −0.92(.354) −0.89(.369)
Observations 421 258 335
Number of firms 86 86 86
Note: Table 7 provides the results when the data are analysed for the three time periods using ROA as dependent variable to proxy shareholder value. All
independent variables are exactly the same as those used in Table 4. L.1, L.2 and L.3 are lags 1, 2 and 3, respectively, of the dependent variables. ***
significance at p < .01, ** significance at p < .05, * significance at p < .1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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organizations. From an agency theory perspective, this
would imply that monitoring is improved only if NEDs
are strictly independent as required by the UK CGC.
With regard to incentives mechanisms, directors'
share ownership is found to be an effective mechanism to
align directors' interests with shareholders. In line with
the assumptions of agency theory, directors' share owner-
ship encourages them to take a long-term view and work
in the best interest of shareholders. However, remunera-
tion seems to be ineffective in aligning directors' interests
with those of shareholders. We therefore offer new
insights into the monitoring mechanisms and incentives
in financial institutions. Our findings suggest that finan-
cial firms should use more effective mechanisms for
enhancing shareholder value rather than those measures
which only encourage short-termism.
Although results of this study as a whole advocate
that compliance with the UK CGC can act as a resilience
factor to performance deterioration in time of financial
distress, these findings are more nuanced than this. Addi-
tional analysis reveals that not all of the provisions in an
equally weighted governance index would affect share-
holder value of firms in the same way. These findings fur-
ther suggest that certain corporate governance
mechanisms are more effective in enhancing shareholder
value than others. This implies that it may not be in the
interest of firms to comply with all provisions of a pre-
scribed code of corporate governance. In this regard, our
results indicate that firms which were non-compliant
with provisions of the UK CGC that required
performance-related pay performed better than those
firms that were complaint. This implies that all gover-
nance prescriptions might not be universally applicable
in different contexts, and that the optimal governance
prescriptions may vary during times of financial distress.
This finding further corroborates our earlier finding of a
negative association between directors' remuneration and
shareholder value.
This study also vindicates the importance of ‘comply
or explain’ principle of corporate governance in the UK
as results suggest that in certain conditions, non-
compliance with specific provisions may in fact be in the
interest of firms and their shareholders. These findings
therefore signify the need for using different governance
mechanisms in different economic conditions and con-
tributes to the growing body of literature that questions
the universality of corporate governance prescriptions in
different countries (Judge, 2012; Van Essen et al., 2013).
The findings of this paper have implications for prac-
titioners and policy makers. First, in terms of policy mak-
ing, we argue that the ‘comply or explain’ principle is
working well for some provisions, but for others, there
might be a need to move toward mandatory compliance
with the UK CGC. As such, a broader perspective on good
corporate governance mechanisms and its regulatory
framework is required to improve corporate governance
of financial institutions. We therefore argue that investors
need to carefully scrutinize the level of compliance and
quality of explanations reported by non-compliant firms.
Moreover, the independence of NEDs seems more impor-
tant for effective monitoring than just increasing the
number of NEDs on corporate boards. Scrutinizing the
independence of NEDs on boards is therefore regarded as
a very important factor from the perspectives of investors
and policy makers. Finally, our findings imply that policy
makers and investors need to carefully consider the type
of incentives and the number of internal controls within
firms because the number of internal controls and the
type of incentives have important implications for share-
holder value during extraordinary times.
Considering the time period and coverage of the
financial sector, we believe that this study makes a valu-
able contribution to the existing literature. However, a
number of limitations still needs to be mentioned. First,
this study relies on the use of corporate governance index
which is constructed giving equal weighting to all of the
provisions. However, as indicated by the findings of this
study, some provisions of the governance code could be
more important than the others. As there is no objective
criterion available which could be used for weighting
individual provisions, using an equal weighted index is
probably the best available option as it does not involve
any subjective judgement by the researchers. Further-
more, the index in this study was developed through the
application of content analysis of the annual reports of
the sample organizations. In order to cross check the level
of compliance with the UK CGC, future research may
employ surveys with board members and shareholders.
Moreover, for understanding the level of importance that
shareholders give to compliance with individual provi-
sions of the UK CGC, interviews could also be conducted
with shareholders, which would help in understanding
the context and the research findings in this area. Lastly,
in our study, we do not explore the trade-off between the
benefits of compliance (higher shareholder value) and
the cost of compliance. If there are no costs associated
with compliance, all firms would likely be complaint.
Further study is merited to shed light on the cost of com-
pliance and how it affects shareholder value.
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1 Other studies that document that a series of policy errors in the
US and relaxation of regulatory conditions were to blame for the
financial crisis (Heilpern, Haslam, & Andersson, 2009;
Lewis, 2009).
2 Studies have also investigated the level of compliance with man-
datory disclosure requirements. For example, Day and Wood-
ward (2004) analysed the extent of compliance of FTSE
100 companies with the UK Companies Act (1985) and found a
lack of compliance with disclosure of information required under
the Companies Act.
3 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act and Basel III are examples of such initiatives.
4 The Financial Reporting Council is the UK's independent regula-
tor responsible for promoting high quality corporate governance
and reporting mechanisms.
5 Discussing the importance of financial institutions, a report publi-
shed in 2019 by TheCityUK shows that the UK financial services
sector is worth over £190 billion, it accounts for 10.9% of the total
tax revenue and employs 2.3 million people in the UK. https://www.
thecityuk.com/assets/2019/Report-PDFs/b258573748/Key-facts-
about-UK-based-financial-and-related-professional-services-2019.pdf.
6 With remuneration committee chairmen, NEDs, company secre-
taries, company chairmen, pay consultants, and CEOs.
7 Financial firms are all those firms for which Industry Classifica-
tion Benchmark (ICB) is 8,000. It includes banks, insurance,
investment companies, life assurance, real estate and speciality
and other finance.
8 Previously known as Hemscott Guru Database.
9 An additional advantage of this approach is that GMM estimates are
robust to dynamic endogeneity, firm fixed effects, endogenous regres-
sors, heteroscedasticity and serial correlation (Schultz et al., 2010).
10 Our non-compliance index is based on the 2003, 2006 and 2008
versions of the UK CGC.
11 To conserve space these results are not reported but are available
on request from the authors.
12 We initially divided our Complaint firms based on an NCI score
of more than 11 (indicating non-compliance with 50% or more
provisions). However, we found that only 2% of the firms docu-
mented an NCI score of 11 or more. For the purposes of a mean-
ingful comparison, we then decided to divide the sample on the
basis of an NCI score of less than 7. This decision is vindicated
by the fact that an NCI score of 7 is almost two times the sample
mean NCI of 3.57, indicating a relatively higher level of non-
compliance as compared with the other firms in the sample.
13 Known as Combined Code at the time.
14 Principle A 3.3 of the 2003 code states that except for smaller
companies at least half of the board excluding the chairman
should be independent non-executive directors. Therefore, 0.50 is
deemed to be a suitable ratio to distinguish between independent
and non-independent boards.
15 To conserve space these results are not reported but are available
on request from the authors.
16 These two provisions relate to compliance with the number of
independent non-executive directors on remuneration, and audit
committees.
17 To conserve space the PCA results are not reported in the paper
but are available from the authors.
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TABLE A1 Provisions from the UK Corporate Governance Code which are included in developing the Non-Compliance Index (NCI)
P1 Principle A.2 of the code states that there should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company between the
running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running of the company's business. No one individual should have
unfettered powers of decision.
P2 Principle A.2.2 of the code states that the chairman should, on appointment, meet the independence criteria set out in section
A.3.1 of the UK corporate governance code.
P3 Principle A.3.3 states that the board should appoint one of the independent non-executive directors to be the senior independent
director.
P4 Principle A.3.2 states that except for smaller companies,a at least half of the board excluding the chairman should be independent
non-executive directors (INEDs).
P5 Principle A.3.2 states that the majority of non-executive directors (NEDs) should be independent.
P6 Principles A.4.1, C.3.1 and B.2.1 state that the board should establish nomination, audit and remuneration committees.
P7 Principle A.4.6 states that a separate section of the annual report should describe the work of the nomination committee,
including the process it has used in relation to board appointments.
P8 Principles A.4.1, C.3.1 and B.2 state that the audit, nomination and remuneration committees should be headed by independent
non-executive directors (INEDS).
P9 Principle A.4.5 states that executive directors should not take more than one non-executive directorship in a FTSE 100 company
nor the chairmanship of such a company.
P10 Principle A.6.1 states that the board should report in the annual report how performance evaluation of the board, its committees
and its individual directors has been conducted.
P11 Principle A.6.1 states that independent non-executive directors led by senior independent director should be responsible for
performance evaluation of the chairman, taking into account the views of executive directors.
P12 Principle A.7.1 states that all directors should be subject to election at their first AGM, and re-election every 3 years.
P13 Principle B.1.1 states that performance-related elements of remuneration should form a significant proportion of the total
remuneration package of executive directors and should be designed to align their interests with those of shareholders and to
give these directors keen incentives to perform at the highest levels.
P14 Principle B.1.2 states that remuneration for NEDs should not include share options.
P15 Principle B.2.1 states that remuneration committee should be entirely composed of independent non-executive directors.
P16 Principle C.2 states that the board should maintain a sound system of internal controls to safeguard shareholders' investments
and the company's assets.
P17 Principle C.2.1 states that the board should, at least annually, conduct a review of the effectiveness of the company's system of
internal controls and should report to shareholders that they have done so.
P18 Principle C.3.1 states that at least three members of the audit committee should be independent non-executive directors.
P19 Principle C.3.1 states that the board should satisfy itself that at least one member of the audit committee has recent and relevant
financial experience.
P20 Principle D.1.2 states that the board should report in the annual report the steps taken to ensure that the board, including the
NEDs, has developed an understanding of the views of major shareholders of the company.
P21 Principle B.1.6 states that notice or contract periods should be set at 1 year or less.
P22 Principle C.3.2 states that the main role and responsibilities of the audit committee should be set out in written terms of
reference.
aA smaller company is one that is outside the FTSE 350 throughout the year immediately prior to the reporting year.
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